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The article is designed to demonstrate that the Western modern life world is 
constituted by the reconstruction of the natural environment in accordance with 
formal logical rules that are not derivable from contingent facts. Logical rules 
are selected as techniques in terms of their value to fulfill “needs” and hence 
to shape the environment into a “technical life world” that becomes globalized 
as “scientific” demanding that the life worlds of the others develop to become 
modern and technical. This means that the globalized technical life world is not 
a set of facts but signitive systems of logical, non-temporal and non-spacial vec-
tors of “communication” taking precedence over the material-productive levels 
of any society. 




Modern Western life world seems to be one among many such worlds, yet its “logic” 
is spreading globally, thus creating a global civilization without national borders. The 
task of this essay is to offer this “logic” which is usually unnoticed although implicitly 
assumed as a ground of all global engagements. We know that throughout the course 
of the twentieth century scientific thought was in a quandary concerning its own ba-
sis: science with its theories and methods wanted to be logical, precise and rational; 
but it also wanted to make ontological claims wherein the only objective reality is 
physical-empirical providing the ground of explanation for all phenomena. Moreover, 
science is value free and any valuation belongs to the subjective realm, which too 
must be explained empirically. It is our contention that the case is not only more com-
plex but science assumes the objectivity of something that is not derivable from any 
empirical facts. This is to say, the first condition of science – being logical – is not 
accessible from any empirical position; second, the notion that science is value free, is 
equally mistaken; given that there are various logical and self-consistent systems, the 
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selectivity of one system over another is a matter of valuation and, above all, cultural 
valuation. Cultural valuation belongs to a life world that consists of intersections of 
events, each pointing one to the other in complex ways, and each bearing various so-
cial meanings (Greimas 1987). In this context, science is one set of such meanings that 
must be located in its function in terms of its practical, cultural, and technical signifi-
cance. This suggests that even technical inventions are not just entities, but comprise a 
complex system of life world interconnections, such as values, economy, productivity, 
education, politics, and even ideologies (Mickunas 1997). This, of course, will have to 
be shown in a detailed and precise manner. 
It is also the case that the current life world is interlaced by multiple scientific 
and technical discourses and practices. One cannot buy a cereal box without being 
exposed to multiple languages and quantities of bio-chemical, nutritional, caloric, etc. 
codes. All this also implicates productive, normative, and even legalistic interconnec-
tions as aspects of a life world. This is to say, the scientific and technical discourses 
and practices do not overlay some primordial life world, but comprise our understand-
ing of the way our world and we are, live and relate. Our mass media are equally 
replete with reports of scientific “studies” and reports of inventions and progress, and 
even of protests against some scientific inventions and technical inovations – all being 
understood as aspects of our life world. No wonder, then, that our technologies are re-
garded equally as “objective” as trees and cucumbers. Scientific practice cannot dem-
onstrate how logic of a given consistent system becomes “applied” to the empirical 
world without the assumption of other conditions that are technically available. After 
all, there is a preunderstanding of the entire environment as accessible to technical 
management, allowing a given population to regard science as “value free”. Yet it is 
precisely the technologically interpreted environment that is pervaded by valuations. 
We must explicate the principles that: first, establish scientific objectivity on the ba-
sis of the objectivity of logic; second, how logic is connected to the resources of the 
environment; third, how the environment itself is technical and valuative; and fourth, 
how particular modern value context pervades the technical logical and scientific en-
terprises (Husserl 1970).
Logic and fact
In this section the question of scientific objectivity will be addressed in terms of the 
understanding of facts as contingent. By the latter is meant that every given factual 
state of affairs could be otherwise than it is. Such states of affairs have no necessity. 
Yet science is designed to connect empirical facts by necessary rules. In principle, 
even if those rules are distributive such that facts are read as statistically probable, the 
very logic of probability is necessary. This implies that there is an essential difference 
between scientific rules of calculation of probabilities as necessary and the calculated 
empirical facts as contingent. The former cannot be derived from the latter. More-
over, any scientist, despite the claim that empirical objectivity is the only source of 
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truth, will also demand respect for scientific formal rules and logic as necessary and 
objective. This suggests that science accepts logic to be another domain of objectivity 
without being able to account for it on the grounds of the presumed empirical reality 
(Husserl 1973).
To avoid other confusions, we add other variations of the difference between logic 
and fact. Psychologists argued that since empirical – physical – facts are the only 
reliable sources of knowledge, everything else is subjective and psychological. In 
this sense, the theory was proposed and is still maintained that since logic is not an 
empirical objective fact then it must be a subjective fact. In turn, since psychology 
claims to be the science of subjective facts, it also claims that logic can be understood 
psychologically. This is to say, logical formulations of science can be derived from 
psychological facts. Obviously, this is a contradiction since every psychological fact, 
as empirical, is radically contingent and it cannot imply any necessary rules or laws. 
Moreover, if psychology were the basis of logic, it would then be the basis of all sci-
ences. In this sense, even logically framed laws of physics would be derivable from 
psychological facts (Seebohm 1962). We are certain that no physicist will grant such 
an absurd theory.
Other sciences, such as sociology, have made claims that all theories, including 
logically framed theories, are social constructs. They can be explained by social in-
terests, whether such interests are economic or power, and therefore the analysis of 
social conditions would imply scientific theories and their logic. This is a variant of 
the psychological theory; instead of deriving science from individual psychological 
facts, we presume to derive science from collective social facts. This is to say, we 
simply postpone the issue without resolving it. Moreover, a description of social facts 
such as collective activities and interests would not imply the logic of social sciences. 
The latter, as a science, will already presume to be able to arrange social facts in 
the framework of scientific rules. Such rules will not respect the differences between 
social facts, psychological facts, or physical facts. They will be regarded as universal 
and necessary, so well testified even by sociology in its effort to become “scientific”.
Another thesis that is currently in vogue is one of evolutionism. This thesis as-
sumes various forms, such as historicism, pedagogy, cumulative affect, and all claim-
ing that while our current scientific knowledge is vast it was slowly accumulated 
through historical learning transmission, and ultimately through the pressures and 
needs of life. In one sense, what we know now, we have learned from our predeces-
sors, and in turn added our own empirical experience, thus providing a continuing 
process and evolution of knowledge. We do not doubt that there is cumulative empiri-
cal experience from generation to generation providing subsequent generations with 
a more complex understanding of themselves and their environment. But such an ac-
cumulation is equally contingent and does not imply the logic of sciences. The point 
is that empirical experiences, no matter how vast, can go on in their accumulation 
without ever leading to formulation of logical rules (Mickunas 1997).
Given the problematic of current explanations of logic from psychology through 
accumulation of factual experience, we can argue that there is a difference between 
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two main domains of objectivity, such that every explanation will presuppose these 
two domains. In this sense, we propose that the scientific domain that becomes trans-
lated into technology is one of pure signification with its own rules of implication 
that in many cases defy our own abilities to master such rules. At least for modern 
age this means that sciences of all types are subject to this signitive domain. If one 
were simply to consider the constitution of various formalized geometries, one would 
be convinced that the psycho-physiological beings that we are could not access such 
geometries. This requires another epistemic layer that is correlated to formalized sys-
tems whose parameters are vectors of significations (Husserl 1932).
Signitive world
There are theoretical notions that something is either given as a fact or a proposition 
that is derived from a number of facts – a general proposition. Assuming that the 
move from facts to general propositions is even possible, such a move will not account 
for our disregard of the meaning of general propositions and their use in a context 
of formal demonstrations. This is to say that general propositions will turn out to be 
inadequate to demonstrate formal conditions. Hence, there is no connection between 
generalization and formalization. Formal operations employ rules that need not re-
spect the truth or falsity of general propositions. In this sense, formalization is a signi-
tive process that correlates to rules such as addition, subtraction, multiplication, and 
division in arithmetic; or rules of implication, inference, deduction in logic, which do 
not reflect anything that is available in generalized propositions. Thus we can operate 
by excluding both empirical facts and the general propositions derived from them, and 
construct in turn empirical facts based on formal requirements. In brief, we can for-
mulate mathematical rules and use any empirical fact to instantiate such rules. More-
over, using such rules, we can transform empirical facts by our practical activities in a 
way that the facts will be directly constructed on the basis of the formal rules. This is 
one level at which material technology arises. 
Technology, at this level, is in principle a transformation of the environmental fac-
tors into signitive life world. This suggests that the very factual objectivity, trans-
formed in this way, is a system of formal signitive relationships. Given that the mod-
ern conception of the environment is regarded to be the sum of material parts that 
are qualitatively and essentially indifferent, then such materiality can be used as a 
condition for any possible reconstruction on the grounds of formal systems. This state 
of affairs implies that our technical life world is more basically a system of signitive 
interconnections (Mickunas 1983). But in principle the formal systems already have 
a subtext: they themselves are technologies of reconstruction of the material environ-
ment. Thus despite scientific claims to be based on empirical facts, the practice of 
science that assumes the objectivity of formal systems as a condition for doing science 
is a process of application that treats the formal sciences as techniques requiring the 
reconstruction of the environment, in ways that the formal techniques imply (Schabert 
1978).
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One constantly talks about applying sciences to reality in order to test whether the 
application is warranted or not. In a superficial way, this is known as testing of hy-
potheses. Obviously, testing the hypothesis does not simply mean opening your eyes 
and looking, but using highly sophisticated technical means. The latter are already 
constructed on the basis of formal requirements as a mediation between the so-called 
physical material world and the logic of science. In this sense, the very testing of 
hypothesis presupposes the background of formal systems that are imbedded in mate-
rial techniques. There emerge phenomena that are self-generating and are beyond 
anyone’s control: 1) formal systems that have no cause and no empirical base and 
disregard any empirical generalization, and, therefore, can be used at will; 2) the em-
pirical environment reduced to indifferent material substance that does not imply any 
qualitative differences; 3) any qualitative generalizations do not imply the formal sys-
tems; and, 4) the view of the formal systems as hypotheses to be tested in the factual 
world implies that the factual world will have to be drawn into the signitive process of 
the formal systems. But as we said before this is technology – the formal systems are 
reified into sundry instrumentalities which, as mentioned above, compose the modern 
Western life world. This logic of “self-generating” formal systems that get directly 
translated into material implements implies that even the material facts are co-exten-
sive with the signitive domain of formal constructions (Jonas 1981). The transforma-
tion of materiality into signitive conditions implies that the social environment is a 
life world structure, consisting of a system of multiple implications. To speak in a lim-
ited traditional sense, all social factual phenomena are not merely factual, but already 
signitive. In this sense, the world we live in is social, historical, scientific, and techni-
cal world of multiple signitive vectors, all comprising a modern life world which is a 
construct that purports to be explanatory and self-explanatory. 
The reason for this self-explanation is the valuation which is in a background that 
grants certain formal systems the practical value to transform the environment in fa-
vor of the so-called “human needs”. Once again, what is theoretically at issue is that 
human needs as empirical be they psychological, sociological, or economic, do not 
imply formal-signitive systems. Therefore, the latter will have to be constructed and 
selected as values to correspond to those needs. We must note that the selection of 
the formal systems as valuable to fulfill the needs has no direct connection with such 
needs. The latter are psychological, biological, social, economic, while the former 
are signitive. In other words, one is premised on empirical generalizations as various 
needs, the other is formal systems that must be connected to such needs by way of 
technical implementation. Therefore, the selection of the formal systems that would 
be relevant will have a criterion that has to be translated into formal systems. This 
means that the criterion will be some valuative principle that will facilitate the deci-
sion as to which formal system will be adequate to apply for the fulfillment of which 
needs. In this sense, there is again a way of saying that the formal systems have to 
become techniques to fulfill the criteria of empirical needs. Yet the process is still 
more complex: the needs themselves are also selected in terms of their significance in 
a given life world, and hence are not a mere observation and generalization of empirical 
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phenomena. In principle formal systems as signitive are valuative to the extent that 
they can fulfill the desires that are equally articulated in terms of socially, psychologi-
cally, and economically signified needs. 
The signitive logics that pervade the life world, with the latter’s valuative selec-
tivities, is also at the background of cybernetic revolution. This is to say, while the 
cybernetic revolution brought in computer science, it has at the same time included 
as a background of the self-generating process of formal systems that are translated 
and reified into the technical environment. The computerized logic as formal has no 
regard to anything that is environmentally, qualitatively differentiated. Its own logic 
does not need to respect the so called “natural-qualitative” differentiations. Any liv-
ing, working, suffering being in this logic of indifference that transcends such a be-
ing, can regard all events in terms of mutually replaceable variants. Social, economic, 
pedagogical, cultic, cultural givens are, in this logic, equivalences in normative ex-
changes. Whether something is labor power, art work, mysticism must subject itself 
to the requirements of formal rules of quantification. The latter, the quantification, 
must become the information to be transmitted globally. While previously tele-visual 
globalization was available and this globalization depended on valuative selectivity of 
large media organizations, the computerized globalization offers any arbitrary access 
to any selectivity. This means that rhetorical propositions as translatable into practices 
will be equivalent to other propositions. No external judgment is possible apart from 
an appeal to other computerized information whose credibility is simply the appear-
ance in the global network. Computerization opens up a domain of any space and any 
time accessed without history, without places and without times. It is a synchronic in-
strument premised on signification that is everywhere and yet not localizable. The age 
of the computer is a world of signification where there is no place and time and, con-
versely, where all places and all times are equivalently accessible. Our task is there-
fore to explore the domain of all places and all times.
Signitive space and time
As we already saw, regardless of the arguments given by positivist historians and an-
thropologists, the simple access to the past is not read as empirical, but conversely 
every empirical discovered datum is read as a text that means. This is to say that what 
we call the past is not accessed empirically, since in principle we cannot be there 
empirically (for example we cannot be at the battle of Waterloo), but we access those 
events by reading texts, monuments, not as empirical data but as various systems. 
This is to say that time and space wherein we locate empirical events is accessible 
only as a signitive framework of sense making to which everyone has access. Given 
that we have no time machines to go from now into the future or the past, the only 
access we have to both of those temporal components is the immediacy of mean-
ing and sense making awareness. In this sense, the globalizing process of cybernetic 
revolution is based on our ability to communicate irrespective of place and time on 
the globe, because we know or understand what the others mean. This suggests that 
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dealing with the computer technology we are presented with immediate access to the 
entire world, not because of our capacity to be empirically everywhere, but because 
of the technical capacity to make present signitively constituted events no matter how 
far or near in the so-called real space and time. In this sense, when someone reads the 
computer messages, that someone does not question the presence of such messages, 
despite the empirical fact that those messages originated ten thousand miles away. In 
this sense, one reads signification as temporally and spatially indifferent. 
In our argument, we note that the reading of a message is prior to and pervades 
the empirical means that transmit the message. Computer, as technological means, is 
a spacio-temporal entity, but it is designed to carry the presence of significations that 
have no specific space-time positions. This would be analogous to the construction of 
the non-Euclidean space. The latter has no empirically given intuitive component. It 
is a pure system of formal constructs that does not point to any material, mental, or 
other “realistic factors”. Yet non-Euclidean geometry is regarded as an important way 
of articulating (if not actually constructing) other dimensions capable of transform-
ing life world environment (Ströker 1965). This kind of non-positional objectivity is a 
condition for computerized communication to the extent that it does not require either 
the senders or the receivers of messages to have the same mental-physical experience. 
As we suggested above, there is a variation between the empirical and the signitive 
such that it is possible to have different empirical factors making the same sense and 
one empirical factor having diverse senses. Since the major level of computer signifi-
cation is logic, then there is a constructive connection between this logic and various 
life world facts, and in turn such facts can be articulated and reconstructed by differ-
ent computer logics. 
Given the computer non-positional logics, and given that they can be carried by 
appropriate technologies, then in principle it is possible to select and to transmit the 
sense of any event as if it were immediately present to anyone. What is at issue is the 
process of selectivity that is not implied by the constructed logics and by the empirical 
events such logics frame. Here we encounter the question of selectivity as valuation. 
Among numerous events signified in a life world, some are regarded as important and 
valuable. At this level, valuation does not have any rules that could be derived from ei-
ther domain, the formal-logical or the technically constructed events of the life world. 
What is required by our analysis are the value conditions that connect signification 
and such events. The point we have reached is the previously mentioned requirement 
of connecting logic with fact, mathematics with data, and sense making with events. 
Since the systems of signification are constitutable at will, they themselves do not 
imply which of them are relevant to the social, economic, pedagogical, cultural as-
pacts of a life world. Resultantly, the very constitution of signitive systems requires a 
value criteria which would say: 1) what formal systems among all possibilities should 
be applied to what aspects and events; and, 2) the criteria for the constitution of spe-
cific formal systems must be part of a society, a political society, political economy, 
political economical ideology, that would provide a clue concerning what is relevant 
among possible formal systems. In fact, we would argue that the very construction of 
147LImeS, 2009, Vol. 2, No. 2: 140–152
computer technology based on logical signification is a technology that embodies val-
uation. This is to say we elect to build this instead of other technology. This is simply 
to remind us that technology embodies valuative conditions and therefore it cannot be 
regarded as a mere empirical fact.
What is appropriate to the theme of space and time is that the technical means that 
embody the formal logic and its valuative subtext can be produced and set up any-
where and any time around the world. Yet it is to be noted that such a set up carries 
with it the social-cultural, economic, and technical life world. Thus, first world im-
ports and transfers the latest technologies to the third world in order to help “develop” 
the local populations, to make them aware of the rest of the world, in brief in order 
for them to be signitively accessible and accessing events no matter where and when. 
This globalizing transference of technology brings with it non-positional space-time 
to all who can afford the technological means. We must remind ourselves that those 
very global means are not mere empirical data or facts, but carry with them valuative 
conditions. For modern Western understanding, values are deemed to be subjective, 
in contrast to the objectivity of the empirical, and as we have argued, to the logical-
signitive domain. Yet the very selectivity of certain logics over others and of their 
connection to the events is valuative. Exporting computer (and other) technologies 
also includes the export of values imbedded in technologies.
Valuative nexus
The ideology of science has been all along that there is a difference between value 
and fact, and that science is value free. We have argued that the required connec-
tion between logic and fact introduces a third component which at base is valuative. 
This is to say that the very understanding of application of logically framed theories 
or hypotheses introduces selectivity among various hypotheses and selectivity what 
domains in the environment are relevant for application and hence techno-logical re-
construction. The reconstruction is an activity premised on human purposes and re-
sultantly on various levels of valuation interpreted in various ways, such as sociologi-
cal, psychological, economic, ideological, and even mythological. Since scientifically 
speaking values do not belong to objectivity, then they are part of the world either 
of subjective or intersubjective proposals. We are not contending that such proposals 
are totally arbitrary, based on individualistic desires, but we are contending that even 
when they are interpreted socially, they still are primarily values. Even if we quantify 
values and claim to have gained objective data, we have not, therefore, abolished their 
value function (Luhmann 1981).
This leads us to the understanding of computer rationality as purposive, value lad-
en, and, therefore, premised on individual or social purposes. We shall argue that the 
computer rationality consist of layers of value systems and in final analysis valuations 
that both promote autonomous selectivity and invention, and in turn place demands 
on individuals and groups. To engage in continuous proliferation of increasing ef-
ficiency and circular creativity requires that any logic that is translated into material 
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implements becomes, in turn, the means to create more novel, encompassing, and ef-
ficient computer logics. This is the subjecting process wherein one is compelled to 
constantly engage in research that is not designed only to discover new facts, but to 
invent new ways to establish logics that would become factually efficient. This is a 
magic circle. The more we constitute new logics that are translated into material im-
plements, such as computers, the more we are capable to use the same computers to 
open up new logics for their own material implementation. But the point of this magic 
circle is an increase in possibilities of valuative selectivity. The latest computer ma-
chines can perform calculations that previous logics were incapable of performing. In 
this sense, the very latest machines can instruct us about the possibilities of new log-
ics (Jonas 1981).
There is an available dogma that computer science is objective and has no need for 
any values; after all, anyone can learn the latest computer programs and the required 
use of this technology. No doubt. Whether in China or Guatemala, the computer will 
be regarded as means to process and transmit information. Thus, the view is that com-
puters are purely technical and indifferent means, usable by anyone, and therefore its 
only value is what particular groups or individuals want to give them. It is like saying 
that there are trees and whatever people want to make of them will give those tress 
their value. But this is a wrong analogy, because the computer systems are themselves 
information, and indeed selected information. First, the imbedded information is a 
particular logic of the computer (the software); second, its specific material design 
(the hardware); third, its economic system of values and the modes of production; 
and finally, the options that it suggests. In this sense, the objectivity of the computer 
embodies various levels of valuations. Those who acquire the latest machinery do 
not acquire means of processing and transmitting messages but also the messages of 
computer logic, embodiment, economy, and basically an entire life world and its so-
cial systems. Moreover, the logic of the programs is designed to process information 
in specific ways. While the user is told that he or she is free to access information, the 
information is mediated by the logic of the program, the economy of affordability by 
specific group, in a specific part of the world, and its purposive rationality that would 
dictate the programs and the messages that the given population will access. In brief, 
the objective claim that computer rationality is merely a means for anyone dealing 
with messages is too restrictive to what computer logic is all about.
The implication is obvious: vast populations of the world would be called upon 
equally to engage in valuation. Do we want the latest hardware to match the latest 
software? Or, do we want to protect the environment, to educate next generations, to 
afford decent housing or medical care? It is the case that all things cannot be accom-
plished at once, and to buy latest hardware may have to be postponed in favor of other 
human purposes and, therefore, to forego the receiving of messages that are deemed 
to be objectively accessible for everyone. We are suggesting that the introduction of 
the computerized systems around the globe is not an innocent presence of means to 
acquire information, but valuational requirements of peoples and their governments 
to deal with what is of greater value in a given society. In short, we are not rejecting 
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the computer logic and its objectivity, yet we wish to show that it belongs in various 
value contexts. At the center of this valuative complexity, there is also the under-
standing that currently the valuations are computer mediated. They are systems of 
significations that are accessible to anyone and anywhere. Valuation here is part of the 
global selectivity, and the question is what type of value significations are currently 
prevailing?
Signitive power
So far so good. But a question remains: why the rush for the newest computer log-
ics, newest and fastest materialization of such logics, and the very transformation of 
the materials into previously unheard of combinations: chips, conductive systems, 
miniaturizations, and massification that lead to increasing compacting of functions? 
Certainly not for the sake of scientific discovery of “objectivity,” since the interests 
and valuations do not aim at objectivity but at its transformation. The more plausible 
conclusion is this: the entire process of metaphysical signitive constructions that are 
directly shifted to application and productivity, imply – strange as it may seem – sig-
nitive power. To understand the latter, we want to argue against the notion of causal 
power of classical tradition: all events in nature have their specific causes. Yet for 
modern understanding, signification, comprising at one level logical and quantitative 
inter-connections, has no causal power. The logical connection “If P then Q” (if it 
rains then the ground will be wet) cannot cause rain, since it is an empty formulation 
that can be applied to anything. Yet what modern understanding of constructing of 
logic implies is this: if we want rain, what logico-mathematical formulations must we 
invent and how such an invention can signify the production of the material condi-
tions for rain. In this sense, valuation implies a selection of logics that are materially 
signitive and hence are “empowered” to transform the environment. Signitive power, 
in this sense, becomes the metaphysically preeminent regard toward the world. It ap-
pears in socio-economic currency as “power of ideas”, or “clash of views”, or “prog-
ress comes from ideas”, or “we need people with creative ideas”, etc. In the classical 
regard, creative ideas belonged to poetry, theater, and rhetoric, but currently, they are 
the very power to elicit transformation of the environment, including the human as 
an aspect of the environment (e.g. genetic reconstruction of the human). Indeed, the 
battle for signitive power has intensified to such an extent that even some main stream 
journals are talking about “who owns your ideas?” In short, signification has to be 
adjudicated socio-economically and even legally (Mann 1998). Once again, one is no 
longer concerned with “pure metaphysics”, but with metaphysics as power.
The very formulation of logic as purposive and applicable implies that this logic 
is the basis of power. What we are suggesting is that the ground of various current 
theories advocating the primacy of discursive power, are premised on the notion of 
application. Discourse as discourse would have no power unless its significations not 
only define but also prescribe the rules of transformation of events in a life world. 
What is at issue here is the radical arbitrariness and contingency of the notion of logic. 
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While initially logic was regarded as the bearer of necessary rules, capable of de-
ciphering the rational structure of nature, now it is seen as a construct that follows 
unfounded purposes. In this sense, there can be many logics wherein each is designed 
to perform a task and hence to be the source of power. As we mention above, the age 
of information, or what some people call postindustrial society, is totally premised on 
transmission, appropriation, creation, and combination of signitive processes. Even 
the traditional notion of capitalism as producing and selling of material values has 
become redundant. What the material values embody is a level of information that is 
more important than the material value. In this sense, the information imbedded in 
computer logic is more valuable than the material production of the computer. This 
value is of course extended to all social domains. As Jean Baudrillard has pointed out, 
the social positioning of persons is not economical, but signitive (Baudrillard 1981). 
People buy signs of importance, even if such signs are simulacra. I am not rich, but 
I post signs of wealth. This phenomenon of signitive importance is paraded in mass 
media when peoples of the so-called third world exhibit their computer knowledge 
and indeed a possession of the latest hardware, despite the fact that the primary needs 
such as shelter, clothing, food are quite inadequate. In short, we are up to date, and 
therefore we are significant.
What appears here as a conclusion of Western modern modernity with its meta-
physics and ontology is, at one level, a reversal of explanation: the current digitali-
zation of signification and proliferation of information systems reveals that modern 
science and technology are basically metaphysical, that is signitive. 
Postscript
While current literatures are still talking about economic and material interests, psy-
chological securities and insecurities, and desires of populations to become part of 
modern history, we contend that these designations are surface appearances of the 
Western modernization with is metaphysical and ontological grounds that have been 
unrecognized so far. While we are not the first ones to suggest that formal and mathe-
matical processes are involved in articulating the world, our claim is that there has not 
been a recognition that the formal-quantitative procedures are at base metaphysical 
and therefore free from the constrains of space and time, and that they have assumed 
priority over the material. We contend that the conditions for the possibility of global-
ization are not economic, psychological, even ideological, but signitive. The reason for 
this claim is that before a particular people in global economy will acquire the eco-
nomic conditions to better their lives they have been already informed signitivelly of 
what is the better life. And the better life is the possession of modern technology, spe-
cifically information technology such as computers and their logic, and above all the 
value preferances imbedded in this logic. This logic, in turn, is the end of temporality, 
end of history; it is all encompassing logic that can transmit its values to any village 
with promises of the production of anything that the logic signifies in global economy. 
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Of course, the villages would be able to access the information once they have ac-
cepted the latest computer – to access this information. The latter is laden with value 
offers, specifically with images of the “good life” that will require the materialization 
of this signitive power. We see the images, then we buy into the global economy to 
materialize those images in the forms of beauty, sun glasses, jeans, kellog cereal, and 
sundry overproduced and overpriced cheap commodities. Computer is the metaphysi-
cal logic that has the power to accomplish this task. 
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šiame straipsnyje parodoma, kaip Vakarų modernusis gyvenamasis pasaulis 
steigiamas, rekonstruojant gamtos aplinką, pagal formalias logikos taisykles, 
kurios nėra išvedamos iš atsitiktinių faktų. Logikos taisyklės yra atrinktos 
kaip technikos pagal jų gebą patenkinti „poreikius“ ir drauge formuoti aplinką 
kaip „techninį gyvenamąjį pasaulį“, kuris tampa globalizuotas kaip „moksli-
nis“. Toks pasaulis reikalauja, kad kitų gyvenamieji pasauliai taptų modernūs ir 
techniniai. Tai reiškia, kad globalizuotas techninis pasaulis nėra faktų rinkinys, 
bet reikšmingos loginių, nelaikiškų ir neerdviškų „komunikacijos“ vektorių sis-
temos, iškylančios virš bet kokios visuomenės medžiaginių gamybinių klodų. 
Reikšminiai žodžiai: atsitiktinybė, formalioji logika, gyvenamasis pasaulis, 
metafizika, svarba, technika.
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